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SETTING PERMIT PRICES IN A TRANSFERABLE 




   The composite market design is a proposal for a Transferable Discharge Permit  (TDP) system 
which specifically includes agricultural non-point source (NPS) dischargers and addresses both 
property rights and transaction cost problems. The first step to implementation of a composite 
market scheme is the estimation of a supply curve for abatement measures in the catchment area. 
Estimation is performed by combining costs with modeled loss reductions from selected Best 
Management Practices (BMPs) and then using this information to estimate the supply curve for 
abatement which in turn can then be used to set permit prices. The Rönneå catchment in southern 
Sweden is used as a pilot study area for making this type of estimate. Costs for existing measures 
that reduce nutrient losses from farmland (catch crops and spring planting) are based on existing 
programs financed by the Swedish Agricultural Board. A set of supply curves is calculated for 
these measures using retention estimates for seven sub-catchments and three soil types in the area. 
Although existing information is sufficient to calculate partial supply curves and may be used to 
set permit prices, additional measures should be included as well as an increased number of 
variables for differentiating site specific reduction costs.  
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Introduction  
 
Achievement of mandated water quality standards has increasingly focused on the role of 
nonpoint source (NPS) discharges, in particular, runoff of nutrients from agricultural activities 
(EPA, 2000; Horan et al, 2002). The use of TDP markets as a policy solution has been advocated 
both by economists and policymakers as the most promising policy alternative, the most cost 
effective means, of meeting environmental targets. The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency in a recent report (EPA, 2003) “believes that market-based approaches such as water 
quality trading provide greater flexibility and have potential to achieve water quality and benefits 
greater than would otherwise be achieved under more traditional regulatory approaches” and that  
“market-based programs can achieve water quality goals at a substantial economic savings”. 
Unfortunately, as Stavins (1995) observed “In some cases, environmental policymaking has 
outrun our basic understanding of the new pollution control instruments”.   
 
In a TDP market, the price signal provides information to market agents, dischargers of 
pollution, which may be used for valuation of their decision alternatives, in particular, their 
decisions with respect to implementation of abatement measures. The price signal provides 
information about the minimum value assigned to the discharge permit by purchasers and in 
addition, is also an indication of their marginal abatement costs. The underlying assumptions that 
abatement costs per unit of emission vary among discharge sources, that information about 
abatement alternatives is available to the source but not to other actors and that price signals 
convey this information, lead to the conclusion that a TDP market offers a cost effective policy 
alternative for achieving discharge targets. A trading program through “introducing transferability 
… offers the potential for substantially lowering costs and for encouraging technological 
[abatement] progress” (Tietenberg, 2000).  Unfortunately, the attempts to start up permit markets 
that are able to exploit abatement cost differences between sources have not met with the success 
expected (EPA, 2001). Two of the reasons for the lack of success have been the problem of 
transaction costs and in the case of non-point sources (NPS), undefined property rights 
(Collentine, 2002a). 
 
The composite market design is a proposal for a TDP system that specifically includes 
agricultural NPS dischargers and addresses both property rights and transaction cost problems 
(Collentine, forthcoming). The composite market consists of three interrelated markets each 
serving a particular function. The two primary markets are coordinated through price information 
that makes it possible for a catchment-based authority to issue (sell) permits based on the marginal 
cost of abatement. When the composite market is mature, the total number of permits issued 
corresponds to a cap on discharges allowed in the catchment. The structure of the composite 
market allows this system to be phased in over time with existing institutions and limited demands 
on financing. 
 
The first step to implementation of a composite market scheme is the estimation of the supply 
curve for abatement measures in the catchment area to be used for setting permit prices. Since an 
initial estimation can be adjusted as new information becomes available, the first estimation 
doesn’t need to be comprehensive. This facilitates the use of partial information in the scheme and 
justifies making preliminary estimates of abatement costs based on existing programs. The 
method combines costs with modelled loss reductions from selected ‘best management practices’ 
(BMPs) and then uses this information to estimate the supply curve for abatement measures which 
can then be used to set permit prices. The Rönne River basin is used in this paper as a pilot area 
for illustrating the procedure for making this type of estimate. Existing agri-environmental 
programs in the area to reduce nitrogen losses from farmland, catch crop and spring cultivation 
programs financed by the Swedish Agricultural Board, are used to demonstrate the procedure.  
 
The first section of the paper describes the three markets of the composite market system. The 
first of these markets, the main subject of this paper, is described in detail. This is followed by a 
section which describes the Rönne River basin catchment area of Southern Sweden and the agri-  4
environmental programs that are used in the study. The next section describes how modelled 
leaching reduction estimates combined with program costs generate a supply curve that may be 
used for the pricing of permits in the Rönne River basin. The paper ends with conclusions drawn 
from the study and suggestions for further research and applications of the model. 
 
The Composite Market System 
 
The composite market disaggregates permit transactions into two primary markets and one 
secondary market (Figure 1). Following the typology of water quality trading programs defined by 
Woodward et al (2002), the composite market combines qualities of both the exchange and 
clearinghouse structures. In a clearinghouse structure, an institution performs a role as a broker 
between sellers of discharge control and buyers of the credits created. A clearinghouse precludes 
the need for bilateral contacts between buyer and seller by providing price information to each of 
these actors as well as providing a market for the individual transactions. The two primary 
markets serve as a clearinghouse for sellers of performance contracts and buyers of discharge 
permits. This greatly reduces the information transaction costs for the individual sources 
(Woodward et al, 2002). In addition, where marginal transaction costs are decreasing with respect 
to the number of transactions performed (Gangadharan, 2000) this will also result in falling costs 
for participation in a TDP system.  
 
The secondary market, like an exchange, is “characterized by its open information structure 
and fluid transactions between buyers and seller” (Woodward et al, 2002). The public availability 
of information about market clearing prices ensures that information transaction costs are 
minimal. The liquidity in this market also makes it easy for actors to enter into and get out of 
transactions, which reduces the uncertainty of taking a position in the market. The combination of 
these effects produces an institution “very close to achieving the fully efficient allocation where 
any trade that would make both the buyer and seller better off is fulfilled” (Woodward et al, 
2002).  
 
A TDP system based on three markets allows permit trading to be separated into individual 
functional components. Because each market is designed to serve a specific purpose this increases 
the accuracy of the individual institution (market) in fulfilling its purpose (Horan and Ribaudo, 
1999). Markets that are independent, but linked and coordinated as integrated components of a 
composite market, can achieve higher levels of efficiency if the costs of coordination are lower 
than the efficiency gains from serving targeted functions. Low information transaction costs are of 
particular importance at early stages of market development when market liquidity (thin markets) 
can lead to problems with the reliability of market price information and hinder the establishment 
of a viable TDP market (Laffont and Tirole, 1994). Coordination in the composite market system 
consists primarily of the flow of price information between the three markets illustrated in Figure 
1. Setting the price for permits is the function of the first market, the primary contract market in 
Figure 1a.  
 
Primary contract market: The supply curve for abatement measures 
 
There are two types of actors active in a primary contract market. On the one hand, the supply 
side, there are dischargers, who through adoption of control (abatement) technology have the 
possibility of reducing their discharges. On the other hand, the demand side, there is a local 
catchment authority with a budget for purchase of discharge reducing measures. Purchases of 
measures by governmental agencies already take place in many catchment areas in the form of 
programs to induce agricultural dischargers through economic incentives (cost sharing or direct 
subsidies) to adopt abatement measures. The potential for least cost abatement of nutrient NPS 
discharges by agricultural producers is often ascribed to the adoption of these BMPs (Horan et al, 
2002, Horan and Ribaudo, 1999; Gustafson et al, 1998; Shortle et al, 1998).  
Support for adoption of measures may be either based on a uniform price for the measure, a 
subsidy or some other type of fixed or predetermined payment, or be in the form of an   5
individualized performance contract. Under an individualized contract the level of payments is 
assumed to be variable but related in some way to a discharge reduction activity. Examples of 
existing programs which support the adoption of BMPs on farms include direct payment for 
taking cultivated land out of production (wetlands or buffer strips), payments to compensate for 
reduced expected yields (catch crops, reduced fertilization, tillage techniques or timing), cost 
sharing (manure storage or adaptation of drainage systems), and the provision of information 
through existing channels (extension services or agricultural producer organizations). These types 
of programs may be national but implementation is often delegated to regional institutions and 









































Figure 1. The composite market model for transferable discharge permits. 
 
The necessary step for the transformation of BMP programs of this type, into credits in a TDP 
program lies in the quantification of the expected effect of the BMP on discharges by the adopting 
source (see Figure 1a). Modelling offers a possibility for site-specific quantification of the effect 
of BMPs when adopted by individual producers. In essence, the use of modelling transforms the 
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NPS discharge into a quasi-NPS discharge or what perhaps may be best described as a model 
generated PS.  
 
The sum of all these model transformed marginal abatement costs generates the supply curve 
in the primary contract market in Figure 1a. Each time the catchment agency enters into a contract 
with a pollution source more information becomes available with respect to marginal abatement 
costs. In an idealized market of this type a purchasing agency with full abatement cost information 
would always purchase the least cost measures first. In the model this gives rise to the upward 
sloping MCA/supply curve depicted in Figure 1a. In practice, incomplete information or particular 
forms of transactions, such as uniform BMP support programs, may lead to model generated 
MCAs that vary in order (not always chronologically ascending from least cost to higher cost 
measures). However, this does not present a problem since the agency unilaterally determines 
which price to use as the ‘last’ price from this market to be transferred to the primary permit 
market. The price of permits in the primary permit market represents the marginal abatement cost 
determined in the primary contract market, the main function of this market. 
 
A secondary function is to provide a market for abatement control activities by quantifying 
and thereby setting marginal values on the reduction through the transformation described above. 
Public information about the shape of the aggregate MCA, the price signal in this market, is an 
indication of the willingness to pay for abatement control by the catchment agency. Dischargers in 
the catchment can use this price as an anchor for making abatement investment decisions. If the 
price derived in this market is above the marginal abatement cost for a discharger then it may be 
possible for the discharger to negotiate a performance contract with the catchment agency for the 
expected reduction.
 Abatement transactions of this type will lower costs for reductions purchased 
and add to the cost efficiencies of the composite market. 
 
The modelled discharge reduction quantities in the primary contract market used to calculate 
marginal abatement costs are presumed to represent the reduction target for catchment water 
quality. The ultimate goal of any TDP system is to achieve a targeted level of discharges. This is 
true for the composite market system as well, the major difference is that reductions are phased 
into the system through activities in the two primary markets. The primary contract market serves 
to phase in discharge reductions from direct performance contracts. Discharge reductions in the 
primary permit market are phased in by choice constrained dischargers who choose this option in 
lieu of purchase of discharge permits. The first step to implementation is development of the 
marginal abatement supply curve, the primary contract market, to be used for setting permit prices 
in the following market. 
 
Abatement Measures In The Rönne River Basin 
 
The Rönne River basin described below serves to demonstrate how program supported 
abatement measures may be combined with leaching models to estimate abatement costs from 
catchment data. Two best management practices are used to calculate the cost per unit of 
reduction and the potential quantity of reduction for the catchment. These particular practices, 
insown catch crops and spring tillage, are used because they are currently subsidized as a part of 
an agri-environmental program targeted at reducing nutrient losses. In addition, modeled results 
are available for root zone nitrogen losses using the SOILNDB model (Johnsson et al, 2002) and 
for estimating net nitrogen loads to the sea from the TRK project (Johnsson and Mårtensson, 
manuscript; TRK at www-nrciws.slu.se/TRK/index.html). 
 
The Rönne River basin 
 
The Rönne River drains a large area of Southern Sweden (1900 km
2) and empties into the 
Kattegatt area of the Baltic Sea on the Swedish west coast (Figure 2). The river basin has a total 
population of 100,000 with about 70% living in urban areas. Around 31% of the basin land area is 
fertile highly productive agricultural land with approximately 55,000 ha under cultivation (Table   7
1). The remainder is primarily in privately managed forest area (48% of the area). At the 
headwaters of the river there are three large lakes with a surface area of approximately 40 km
2 that 
are important as a recreational area. The Rönne basin has a history of high levels of nutrients 
transported by surface water to the Kattegatt where eutrophication is a problem.  
 
 Figure 2. The Rönne River basin, sub-catchments (TRK project) 
 
In a comprehensive national study over nitrogen loads from Swedish land areas to surrounding 
seas, the TRK (Transport – Retention – Source) project, the basin area was divided into the set of 
seven sub-catchments depicted in Figure 2 (TRK at www-nrciws.slu.se/TRK/index.html). 
Retention data from this study was used to calculate total loads measured as N losses at the root 
zone using the SOILNDB model minus background losses (before retention) and the share of this 
load from land use in the basin registered for EU agricultural program support. The annual 
transport of nitrogen from the basin to the sea is approximately 2,200 tons of which the 
contribution from cultivated land is around 1,300 tons (TRK at www-
nrciws.slu.se/TRK/index.html).  
 
Cultivated soils in the basin consist primarily of three types; loam, sandy loam and loamy 
sand. The distribution of these soils is estimated in Table 1 as a percentage of agricultural soils for 
each of the seven sub-catchments (Lidberg et al, 2003). Since the two BMPs used in this study 
(described below) are recommended for use in cultivation of spring cereals (spring barley, spring 
wheat and oats) the area of each soil type in Table 1 is calculated as the percentage of total 
cultivated land sown in these three cereals in the catchment in 2003, that is, 53% of the area of 
each soil type (SCB, 2004).  
 
Catch crop and spring tillage subsidy programs 
 
Cultivation practices that can reduce nitrogen leaching have been supported in Sweden 
through a program of subsidies directed at specific regions, including the Rönne River basin. Two 
of the agri-environmental programs aimed at reducing nutrient losses from farming practices 
through payments to land owners are a catch crop program and a spring tillage program. The 
original goal of the catch crop program when it was initiated in 1995 was that 39,000 hectares in 
Southern Sweden, the designated support area, would eventually be signed up with the program.  
96-001





The level of compensation was set at 62.50 USD
-ha 
1. During 1996, a little over 4,800 acres, 
representing around 12% of the goal, were included in the program. Due to this low interest the 
compensation level was almost doubled in 1998 to 112.50 USD
-ha after a recommendation by the 
Swedish Board of Agriculture. This increase led to a somewhat higher participation rate, an 
enrolment of 7,900 hectares or about 20% of the target level but the low level of participation led 
to a new set of recommendations from the Board of Agriculture. Participation rules were relaxed 
with respect to dates for sowing and ploughing in the catch crop and complementary payments 
could be received for delayed cultivation, spring tillage. (SOU, 1999). Current new rules have led 
to oversubscription in the program the question of which factors led first to the lower than 
expected participation rate and then to the greater than expected participation rate have yet to be 
understood (Collentine, 2002). The two programs may be entered into for a five year period either 
together with annual compensation at 162.50 USD
-ha, or seperately at 112.50 USD
-ha and 50 USD
-
ha respectively.  
 
Table 1. Rönne River catchment area by subcatchment; land area, cultivated land, three soil types 
as a percentage of the total area in the sub-catchment, total estimated number of hectares per soil 
type in each sub-catchment with a potential for catch crops and/or spring tillage, gross loading of 
N in tons, and net loading as a percentage of the total load. (Source: Data adapted from TRK 
project at www-nrciws.slu.se/TRK/index.html and Lidberg et al, 2003). 
 
Modelled leaching estimates 
 
Root zone leaching estimates were made within the TRK program using data from the 
SOILNDB model (Johnsson and Mårtensson, manuscript). The leaching estimates in Table 2 are 
for spring barley on the three different types of soil for four sets of cultivation practices; no 
measures, combined catch crop and spring tillage, catch crop only and spring tillage only. The 
leaching estimates for the two other cereals are similar but separate estimates for each soil type in 
the catchment were not available. 
 
Subsidies for the three sets of BMPs were combined with estimated leaching by soil type to 
calculate the cost per kilogram of the reduction in root zone leaching by measure and soil type.  
 
                                                
1 The exchange rate used in this study is 8 SEK
-USD. The exchange rate on 22/9 2004 was 7.36314 
SEK
-USD. 


















15300  24200  55800  24100  19100  26100  24900  190000 
Cultivate 
land 
7100  7100  14400  3700  2000  7700  12500  54600 
loam  0%  9%  30%  15%  13%  17%  31%  21% 
ha  0  342  2290  302  133  680  2056  6068 
loamy 
sand 
0%  9%  7%  8%  25%  8%  10%  9% 
ha  0  342  509  151  265  340  685  2567 
sandy 
loam 
100%  82%  57%  77%  50%  42%  34%  56% 
ha  3763  3079  4325  1508  530  1700  2284  16103 
Gross N 
load 
212.4  198.7  296.2  67.0  41.4  358.5  539.9  1714.1 
Net N 
load (%) 
47%  41%  83%  81%  82%  72%  84%  72%   9
  loam  loamy sand  sandy loam  subsidy USD
-ha 
No measures applied  53  70  62   



























Table 2: Rönne River catchment area; estimated leaching by soil type and applied best 
management practice (kg
-ha) and subsidy for each measure (USD
-ha).
 (Source: Adapted from 
Lidberg et al, 2003). 
 
These estimates were combined with retention estimates for each sub-catchment to produce the 
estimated cost per net unit of reduction (load to the sea) and potential reduction for each of these 
sub-catchments (Tables 3a, 3b). The potential reduction for each soil type in the catchment was 
calculated from the total cultivated area in the catchment with a potential for applying the 
measures (Table 1). This last set of tables (Tables 3a, 3b) contains all the information needed to 
construct supply curves for marginal abatement in the catchment. 
 
Table 3a: Cost per kg for subsidized agricultural abatement measures in the Rönne River 
catchment area; sub-catchment estimated cost per unit of net leaching reduction by soil type and 






The first step in implementing the composite market permit scheme is the determination of a 
price for issuing discharge permits. The function of the primary contract market in the model (see 
Figure 1a) is to gather information for pricing permits through the development of a supply curve 
for abatement measures. This supply curve describes marginal abatement costs for reducing 
pollutants in a particular area (river basin, watershed). Derivation of the abatement supply curve 
requires estimates of the cost per unit of reduction as well as the expected quantity of potential 
reduction for that unit cost. This in turn requires data on the cost of abatement measures and the 
expected effect on discharge volumes from these measures.  
















Catch crop and 
spring tillage 
             
loam  14.40  16.51  8.16  8.36  8.26  9.40  8.06 
loamy sand  10.18  11.66  5.76  5.90  5.83  6.64  5.69 
sandy loam  11.93  13.66  6.75  6.91  6.84  7.79  6.68 
Catch crop only               
loam  15.96  18.29  9.04  9.26  9.15  10.41  8.93 
loamy sand  12.60  14.44  7.14  7.31  7.23  8.23  7.05 
sandy loam  13.30  15.25  7.53  7.71  7.63  8.68  7.44 
Spring tillage 
only                
loam  13.30  15.25  7.53  7.71  7.63  8.68  7.44 
loamy sand  8.86  10.16  5.03  5.15  5.09  5.79  4.96 
sandy loam  10.64  12.20  6.03  6.18  6.10  6.95  5.95   10
Table 3b: Total potential reduction for subsidized agricultural abatement measures in the Rönne 
River catchment area; net estimated leaching by soil type and applied BMP (in tons). 
 
Partial supply curves for abatement measures in the Rönne River basin 
 
The supply curves in Figure 3 represent graphically the data from Tables 3a, 3b. The cost on 
the y axis in the diagram is the calculated cost per unit of reduction from the three measures. This 
is the cost that is hypothetically paid by the purchasing agency, in this case the Swedish Board of 
Agriculture, for the BMPs which generate the reduction. It may be regarded as the price which 
society pays to purchase the corresponding reductions. The quantities on the x axis are the 
potential reductions associated with each price. In theory this is the volume of reduction which 
could be obtained at that particular cost per unit. Since the costs are calculated upon the premise 
that the subsidy for each measure is acceptable to all farmers in the area, the cost is a low estimate 
of the actual costs. The measures in the supply curves are not aggregated because they represent a 
discrete choice for cultivation practices on a particular field. Choosing one of the measures 
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Figure 3. Supply curve for selected BMPs in the Rönne River basin by soil type and sub-
catchment area retention. 
 















Catch crop and 
spring tillage 
             
loam  0  3.4  45.6  5.9  2.6  11.7  41.4 
loamy sand  0  4.8  14.4  4.2  7.4  8.3  19.6 
sandy loam  51.3  36.6  104.1  35.4  12.6  35.5  55.6 
Catch crop 
only 
             
loam  0  2.1  28.5  3.7  1.6  7.3  25.9 
loamy sand  0  2.7  80.2  2.3  4.1  4.7  10.9 
sandy loam  31.8  22.7  64.6  22.0  7.8  22.0  34.5 
Spring tillage 
only  
             
loam  0  1.1  15.2  2.0  0.9  3.9  13.8 
loamy sand  0  1.7  5.1  1.5  2.6  2.9  6.9 
sandy loam  17.7  12.6  35.9  12.2  4.3  12.2  19.2   11
The supply curves in Figure 3 represent twenty-one separate points for each of the three 
measures. The shape of each of the curves is similar. A small rise in price from initial levels leads 
to a fairly large volume of reductions up to a certain point (at about 400 tons for the combined 
measures) at which level the change in price increases sharply while the increase in reductions is 
small. This is followed by a flat section and then ends on a sharp price rise again. If this 
information were to be used to set a price for issuing permits in the primary permit market of the 
composite market scheme one obvious choice is to set a price at 8.50 USD
-kg, just before the cost 
per unit rises steeply, or just before the second rise at 12.00 USD
-kg. Revenue from purchasers of 
permits could be used to purchase reductions through any of the three measures but as can be seen 
in Figure 3 the highest levels of reduction come from purchasing the combination of the two 
measures.  
 
Use of the three soil types and estimated net loading to the sea (retention) as explanatory 
variables gives rise to varying estimated leaching losses and cost differentials. The abatement 
supply curve describes a potential for exploiting these differentials in a trading program. That is, it 
would be possible to realize economic efficiencies with high cost abatement sources willing to 
enter into agreement with low cost sources with the two sources sharing the economic gain. If the 
sources were constrained to purchase permits (a hypothetical case but one that may nonetheless 
become a reality within a 20 year time frame), then choosing a price to sell permits at such as 
8.375 USD
-kg would lead to a high volume of abatement by low cost producers (400 tons in the 
case of catch crops combined with spring tillage) and demand for permits by a smaller set of high 
abatement cost producers. The wedge between the high and low cost sources may be sufficient to 
pay for the costs of maintaining the system (transaction costs) and lead to social economic gains 
from a trading program. However, this is an empirical question that requires further study before 




The purpose of this study has been to illustrate how abatement supply curves can be generated 
for a particular catchment area which make it possible to set permit prices in a composite market 
trading scheme. There is a positive relationship between the level of abatement and the cost per 
unit of reduction, as the level of reduction increases the cost per unit increases. With access to a 
supply curve of this type a watershed agency could set a price for the sale of permits which could 
in theory compensate for the purchase of reductions from other sources. This is the principle of 
economic efficiencies that make a tradable permit system interesting, increasing the total level of 
abatement at the lowest cost.  
 
The study illustrates clearly how economic variables can be combined with bio-physical 
process models to quantify the effect of agronomic practices on nutrient losses. This in turn makes 
possible the creation of limited property rights which are a prerequisite for a successful trading 
scheme. Comparison of the two supply curves indicates the value of site specific information. If 
this information is incorporated into agri-environmental program reporting a data base could be 




This study illustrates the methodology for generating abatement supply curves. While the 
method may be generalized to set prices in other trading schemes, the partial nature of the supply 
curve where data is phased in as it becomes available is particularly appropriate where the permit 
issuing market is also phased in over time. Additional measures should be included in future 
studies to increase the amount of information, and sources, in the abatement supply curve. Finally, 
before gains from trading can be estimated, schemes for constraining discharge sources must be 
studied to estimate the potential for creating a market in permits. 
   12
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